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PENNSYLVANIA SAYS, "NOT IN MY HOUSE"
I. INTRODUCTION
On March 23, 1988 Pennsylvania enacted major anti-takeover legis-
lation.' The main provisions of the act address the state legislature's
concerns regarding the vulnerability of Pennsylvania corporations and
their shareholders to hostile takeovers. 2 The new law is aimed at pro-
tecting Pennsylvania corporations from abusive takeover tactics which
tend to weaken businesses, eliminate jobs and threaten communities
built on the strength of local industry.3 The legislation was enacted in
the wake of the recent passage of anti-takeover legislation by several
other states. 4
1. Act of March 23, 1988, 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 158 (Purdon) [hereinafter
Pennsylvania Act] (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1611, 1910 & 1911 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989)) (effective March 23, 1988). The act was signed into effect by
Governor Casey; Senator Noah W. Werger and Representative Robert W.
O'Donnell were the primary sponsors of the legislation in the Senate and
House, respectively. Governor Casey Signs Shareholder Protection Legislation Into Law,
15 CHAMBER SPECTRUM 2 (Pennsylvania Chamber of Business and Industry)
(March 28, 1988) [hereinafter Casey Signs Shareholder Protection Legislation].
2. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES DEMOCRATIC COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 1988, at 1 (1988) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]
(bill analysis reflects intent of legislature "to clarify and streamline certain pro-
cedures aimed at stopping hostile takeovers and to enact additional provisions
having the same purpose as they relate to publicly held Pennsylvania
corporations").
3. Casey Signs Shareholder Protection Legislation, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1221 to -1223 (Supp. 1987-88) (simi-
lar to § 911 of new Pennsylvania legislation except time limit on business combi-
nations is three years in Arizona versus five years in Pennsylvania); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988) (similar provisions to § 911 of Pennsylvania legis-
lation requiring five-year ban on business combinations); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-
1-43-19 (West Supp. 1988) (business combinations with interested shareholders
limited within five years of share acquisition date); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 271B. 12-210 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (five-year limitation on busi-
ness combinations with some exceptions similar to § 911 of new Pennsvhvania
legislation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1988) (shareholders to
receive fair payment for shares following "control transaction"); MINN. ST'.vr.
ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1988) (five-year general restraint on certain types
of business combinations); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1988)
(identifies permitted business combinations and exceptions to general live-year
limitation period on certain business combinations similar to § 911 of new Penn-
sylvania legislation); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A: IOA-4 (West Supp. 1988) (five-year
ban imposed on particular business combinations with interested shareholder);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1986) (requirements relating to particu-
lar permitted business combinations sinilar to § 911 of new Pennsvh, ania legis-
lation); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.16 (Anderson 1985) (authorizing issuance
of shareholder rights and options as takeover defense); WASH. REV. CoD, ANN.
§ 23A.50.040 (Supp. 1988) (limitation placed on significant business combina-
tions for live years); Wis. S'v'r. ANN. § 180.155 (West Supp. 1988) (expressly
(739)
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Apparently, the majority of the state statutes have been adopted in
response to the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,5 which upheld an Indiana anti-takeover
statute. CTS Corp. reaffirmed the proposition that states may constitu-
tionally regulate their domestic corporations. 6 Against this background,
Pennsylvania enacted its anti-takeover statute. 7
The new legislation consists of three parts. First, it adds an amend-
ment to section 611 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law
(BCL)8 which expressly permits the use of shareholder rights plans or
so-called "poison pills." Second, it includes an amendment to section
910 of the BCL' 0 which reduces the threshold percentage of voting
ownership required for a transaction to be deemed a "control transac-
tion."'' Third, it creates a new section 911 of the BCL which estab-
lishes the circumstances under which a publicly traded corporation may
enter into a "business combination" with an "interested shareholder." '2
ratifying use of shareholder rights plans as takeover defense); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 180.725 (West Supp. 1988) (five-year limitation on business combinations).
5. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). CTS Corp. involved a tender offeror, Dynamics Cor-
poration of America (Dynamics), which brought suit to enjoin enforcement of
Indiana's Control Acquisitions Chapter, a statute regulating takeovers of Indi-
ana corporations. Id. at 75-76. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 to -Il (West
Supp. 1988). Dynamics contended that the Indiana statute was invalid because
it was preempted by the Williams Act and violated the federal dormant com-
merce clause. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 75. The Williams Act requires a purchaser
to disclose information concerning the offer when the purchase will result in the
purchaser owning more than five percent of a class of stock. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(d)(1) (1982). In addition, the Williams Act establishes procedural rules to
govern tender offers. Id. § 78n(d)(5)-(7). The Indiana statute provided that the
acquisition of shares in a domestic corporation which brought an individual's
voting power up to or above certain prescribed voting levels would not include
voting rights unless ratified by a majority of all pre-existing disinterested share-
holders at the next regularly scheduled shareholders' meeting. CTS Corp., 481
U.S. at 73-75. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (West Supp. 1988). The
Supreme Court rejected the challenges by Dynamics and indicated that the stat-
ute was compatible with both the Williams Act and the dormant commerce
clause. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 94.
6. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89.
7. See Pennsylvania Act, supra note 1.
8. Section 611 of the BCL is codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1611 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989).
9. For a discussion of the amendment to § 611, see ifra notes 13-30 and
accompanying text.
10. Section 910 of the BCL is codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Pur-
don Supp. 1989).
11. For a discussion of the amendment to § 910, see in a notes 31-53 and
accompanying text.
12. PA. STAT. ANN. til. 15, § 1911 (Purdon Supp. 1989). For a discussion of
new § 911, see iiifia notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
740 [Vol. 34: p. 739
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A. Section 611: Poison Pills
The amendment to section 611 is a reaction to case law in other
jurisdictions holding shareholder rights plans or "poison pill" defenses
by target corporations invalid either because of the legislature's silence
regarding the validity of such provisions or because the legislature has
expressly prohibited such provisions as being discriminatory.'13 In es-
sence, the statute provides that a corporation may institute a discrimina-
tory shareholder rights plan which creates stock rights or options that
the corporation may issue as dividends to its shareholders upon the oc-
currence of specific events that are indicative of an imminent takeover. '
4
The rights or options generally allow a shareholder to purchase addi-
tional shares or assets of his or her corporation (target corporation) at a
discounted rate, 15 or to purchase shares of the acquiring corporation at
13. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 644 F. Supp. 1229
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discriminatory character of "flip-in" provision of rights plan
was ultra vires under New Jersey law proscribing discrimination among share-
holders of same class and series); Ministar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (non-transferability of rights plan unauthorized by
New Jersey); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J.
1985) (discriminatory nature of stock dividend which conferred voting rights on
all holders except acquiring corporation invalid under New Jersey corporate
law). But see Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (finding im-
plicit authorization for the creation of discriminatory rights plan under title 8,
§ 157 of the Delaware Code).
14. For an example of a shareholder rights plan, see Moran v. Household
Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Moran involved a shareholder rights plan
which provided for stock rights to be issued to shareholders if either of two
events occurred: 1) the announcement of a tender offer for 30% or more of the
corporation's outstanding shares or 2) an individual acquired 20% of its out-
standing shares. Id. at 1349. The rights allowed the holder to purchase '/i0 of a
share of new preferred stock for $100. Id. If a merger or consolidation oc-
curred, the rights "flip-over" provision would be triggered and the holder of the
rights could purchase $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100.
Id.
The relevant language of the amendment to § 611 is as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in its articles prior to the creation
and issuance thereof, a business corporation may create and issue
(whether or not in connection with the issuance of any of its shares or
other securities) option rights or securities having conversion or option
rights entitling the holders thereof to purchase or acquire shares, op-
tion rights, securities having conversion or option rights, or obliga-
tions, of any class or series, or assets, of the corporation, or to purchase
or acquire from the corporation shares, option rights, securities having
conversion or option rights, or obligations, of any class or series,
owned by the corporation and issued by any other person.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § I 611(A) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
15. This is characterized as a "lip-in" provision which is designed to pro-
tect against creeping takeovers and other takeover abuses not covered by a "flip-
over" provision. Richards, Brossard & Williams, Righis Plans Dezelopmleuls amd
Recelt Liligation, 10 Nat'l l..J., May 23, 1988, at 28, col. 1. In the event an indi-
vidual or entity becomes an owner of more than a specified percentage of out-
1989]
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a discounted rate. I The amendments to section 611 allow the board of
directors of a company with voting stock registered under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to exclude some shareholders from exercising the
rights or options granted under the shareholder rights plan.17 There-
fore, an individual attempting a takeover of a corporation by the
purchase of a certain percentage of outstanding shares may be barred
from exercising his or her rights or options.' 8 At the same time, how-
ever, the other shareholders of the corporation may exercise their rights
or options at a discounted price. This results in a dilution of the equity
position of the individual seeking to acquire control of the target
corporation. i,
Finally, despite the adoption of these provisions, the poison pill
need not be invoked, and in some instances it may not be invoked be-
cause the board of directors usually will have the discretion to invalidate
standing stock, the rights "flip-in" and each holder of a right is entitled to
purchase stock in the target corporation at a 50% discount. Id.
16. This is termed a "flip-over" provision which is designed to halt two-
tiered mergers. Id. In the event of a two-tiered merger or other specified acqui-
sition of the target corporation, the rights "flip-over" entitles the holders of the
rights to purchase stock in the acquiring corporation at, for example, a 50%
discount. For an example of a "flip-over" provision, see the discussion of .1lo-
ran, supra note 14.
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1611(D) (Purdon Supp. 1989). For the statu-
tory language permitting such discriminatory practices, see ifra note 18. A
company which is required to register stock under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 is a company which has shares traded on a national securities exchange.
15 U.S.C. § 781(a) (1982). In addition, a company required to register stock
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 includes an issuer "engaged in inter-
state commerce, or in a business affecting interstate commerce, or whose securi-
ties are traded by use of . . . any means of instrumentality of interstate
commerce," and has assets greater than $1,000,000 and equity securities held by
at least 500 but less than 750 shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(l)(B) (1982).
18. The relevant language authorizing a board of directors of a reporting
company to create "discriminatory" terms is as follows:
The securities, contracts, warrants, or other instruments evidenc-
ing any shares, option rights, securities having conversion or option
rights, or obligations of a corporation may contain such terms as are
fixed by the board of directors, including. without limiting the genera/if
' 
of
such authori: . . .conditions that preclude or limit any person or per-
sons owning or offering to acquire a specified number or percentage of
the outstanding common shares, other shares, option rights, securities
having conversion or option rights, or obligations of such a corporation
or transferee or transferees of any such person or persons fron exercis-
ing, converting, transferring or receiving such shares, option rights, Se-
curities having conversion or option rights, or obligations.
PA. STA'. ANN. tit. 15, § 16 11 (D) (Purdon Stipp. 1989) (emphasis added).
It appears that no limits are placed upon lhe board of' directors with irespect
to the terms of the rights or options other than their fiduciary duty. Id.
§ 1611(E).
19. See, e.g., Facet Enters. %. Prospect Group, No. 36140 ()el. Ch. Apr. 15,
1988) (WESTIAW, Statcs library, 1E-CS file) (triggering of poison pill would
cause $50 million loss by1 acquiring individual).
[Vol. 34: p. 739
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the poison pill rights or options.2 " The board of directors, however,




The amendments to section 611 will have a dramatic impact upon
Pennsylvania corporations, foreign corporations and practitioners.
Although poison pills are not a complete defense to a takeover, they
significantly influence the events of any takeover scenario in which they
are involved. 22
The express validation of poison pills by the state legislature
removes any fear that a target corporation's adoption of a poison pill
will be held to be ultra vires.2 3 The decision by a target corporation's
board ,of directors to adopt a poison pill, however, will be evaluated
under the business judgment rule.2 4 The amendment to section 611
makes this explicit. It states that "[n]othing contained in [the] section
shall be construed to effect a change in the fiduciary relationship be-
tween a director and a business corporation or to change the standard of
care of a director." 2 5
In Pennsylvania, a director owes a fiduciary duty to act "in good
faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, skill
20. The poison pill rights or options would normally be redeemed by the
issuing corporation upon approval by the board of directors.
21. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). Revlon involved competing takeover bids by two corporations for
Revlon, Inc. Id. at 175. The Delaware Supreme Court stated that the fiduciary
duty of the board of directors of Revlon changed once they had realized that the
takeover of the corporation became inevitable as indicated by the increasingly
higher bidding for the corporation's stock. Id. at 182. The court held that once
the takeover was inevitable, the duty of the board shifted to obtaining the high-
est possible price for the corporation. Id.
22. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d 173. For a further discussion of Revloni, see
supra note 21. Under Revlon, a board of directors theoretically must accept a bid
for the corporation which is in the best interests of the shareholders. Therefore,
a poison pill is not a complete defense to a takeover because the board of direc-
tors may be required to redeem the poison pill rights or options. However, a
poison pill defensive measure would likely encourage a potential acquiror to
negotiate rather than trigger the poison pill.
23. For the exact language and a discussion of the amendment, see supra
notes 13-21 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of the ltra vires de-
fense, see infa note 30 and accompanying text.
24. PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 15, § 1611 (E) (Purdon Supp. 1989). Courts have
traditionally evaluated the conduct of a Pennsvlvania corporation's board of di-
rectors in a takeover context under the business judgment rule. See. e.g-., Kevser
v. Commonwealth Nat'l Fin. Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1130 (M.). Pa. 1986) (in situa-
tion where board of directors agreed to "lock tip option" with "white knight,"
court interpreted Pennsylvania law as allowing business judgment rule presump-
tion of propriety of board of directors' actions in absence of bad faith, fraud or
selfinterest); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678 (E.1). Pa. 1985)
(interpreting Pennsylvania law as requiring presumption of business judgment
rule in absence of bad faith, fraud or selflinterest).
25. PA. STvT'. ANN. lit. 15, § 1611 (E) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
7431989]
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and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances."12 " Absent a showing of a "breach of fiduciary duty, lack
of good faith or self dealing," under the business judgment rule a target
corporation's board of directors' action or omission is "presumed to be
in the best interests of [the] corporation."'2 7 Consequently, a board of
directors' good faith decision to adopt a shareholder rights plan will
likely be upheld. A board of directors, however, should be cautioned
regarding a possible change in the fiduciary relationship in light of the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings28 . Revlon requires the target corporation's board of di-
rectors to affirmatively negotiate a takeover of its corporation once it
becomes apparent that its sale is inevitable due to increasingly higher
bidding. 2 9
Hostile acquiring corporations and their counsel will likely be con-
fronted with poison pill defenses in Pennsylvania target corporations.
These acquiring corporations will be unable to argue that such a poison
pill defense is ultra vires.30 Absent a breach of fiduciary duty by the tar-
get corporation's board of directors, an acquiring corporation will have
to negotiate with the target corporation.
B. Section 910: Appraisal Rights
Section 910 is aimed at the prevention of two-tiered takeovers."' In
such a takeover, an individual seeks control of a corporation without
giving other shareholders the right to receive the "fair value" for their
shares. The amendments to section 910 of the BCL reduce the percent-
age of voting power which an individual or group must obtain in order
to have the transaction deemed a "control transaction" from thirty to
twenty percent.3 2 Under the amendment, once the twenty-percent
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(a) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
27. Id. § 8363(c).
28. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet to
explicitly adopt the Revlon analysis.
29. For a discussion of this change in the fiduciary duty standard, see spra
notes 21-22 and accompanying text. It follows that the adoption of a poison pill
could be a violation of a board of directors' fiduciary duty where the sale of a
corporation is inevitable.
30. "Ultra vires" is defined as "[a]cts beyond the scope of the powers of a
corporation, as defined by its charter or laws of state of incorporation." Bi.ACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th ed. 1979). Prior to the adoption of the amendment
to § 611, the Pennsylvania courts had not decided whether the adoption of a
poison pill was ultra vires.
31. See HousE. REPO'RT, supra note 2, at 2 ("I tIhis would preclude two-tiered
offers"). In a two-tiered takeover attempt, the acquiror initially only purchases a
sufficient number of shares to gain control of the corporation. Then, in the sec-
ond tier, the remaining shareholders are cashed out of the corporation at a mini-
mtim cost to the acquiror.
32. PA. STAr. ANN. Iit. 15, § 1)10 (Purdon Stipp. 1989). The amendment to
§ 910 defines a controlling person or group as:
744 [Vol. 34: p. 739
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threshold is reached, the controlling shareholder must provide notice of
the control transaction to every holder of the corporation's voting stock
and the court of common pleas in the county where the corporation's
registered office is located. 3 3 The notice must inform the noncontrol-
ling shareholders of the opportunity to demand the "fair value" for their
shares from the controlling shareholder. 3 4
Prior section 910 defined a control transaction as the acquisition,
directly or indirectly, of over thirty percent of the corporation's voting
stock by an individual or group of individuals acting in concert.3 5 The
new amendment provides that those individuals currently owning
twenty percent or more of a corporation's voting stock will not be af-
fected by the amendment unless they subsequently increase their voting
power by acquiring additional stock.3 6 In addition, voting power over
certain shares specified by section 910 will not be included in any
twenty-percent calculation. 3
7
[A] person who has, or a group of persons acting in concert that has,
voting power over voting shares of the corporation that would entitle
the holders thereof to cast at least twenty per cent of the votes that all
shareholders would be entitled to cast in an election of directors of the
corporation.
Id. § 1910(B)(l).
33. Id. § 1910(C).
34. Id. The relevant language of the statute is as follows:
Prompt notice that a control transaction has occurred shall be given by
the controlling person or group to .. . each shareholder of record of
the corporation holding voting shares and . . . [t]he notice must state
that . . . all shareholders are entitled to demand that they be paid the
fair value of their shares ....
Id.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B)(4) (Purdon Supp. 1988). In addition,
prior § 910 of the BCL provided noncontrolling voting shareholders of a pub-
licly-traded Pennsylvania corporation with the right to receive the "fair price"
for their shares following a control acquisition under the same procedure given
to dissenting shareholders under § 515 of the BCL. Id. § 1910(E).
36. The relevant language of the amendment states:
[A] person or group which would otherwise be a controlling person or
group within the meaning of this section shall not be deemed such a
controlling person or group unless, subsequent to the later of the effec-
tive date of this amendatory act or the date this section becomes appli-
cable to a corporation by bylaw or article amendment or otherwise, that
person or group increases the percentage of outstanding voting shares
of the corporation over which it has voting power to in excess of the
percentage of outstanding voting shares of the corporation over which
that person or group had voting power on such later date, and to at
least [20% of the votes that all shareholders would be entitled to cast in
an election of directors], as the result of forming or enlarging a group,
or acquiring, by purchase, voting power over voting shares of the cor-
poration ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B)(2)(i) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
37. Id. § 1910(B)(2)(ii). The relevant statutory language provides that the
following shares shall not be counted in order to meet the 20% minimum:
(a) shares which have been held continuously by a natural person
7
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Furthermore, the amendments to section 910 establish a minimum
statutory fair value which a controlling shareholder must pay to noncon-
trolling shareholders after the control transaction.38 This statutory fair
value ensures that the amount paid to a dissenting shareholder in a con-
trol transaction will be at least equal to the highest price per share paid
by the controlling shareholder within ninety days of the date that the
controlling shareholder acquired his twenty-percent interest. ' The
statutory fair value requirement appears to be aimed at protecting dis-
senting shareholders from the abuses of two-tiered mergers sometimes
used by those seeking control of a target corporation.4 0 Corporate raid-
ers will no longer be able to cash out minority shareholders at less than
a fair price in the second tier of two-tiered mergers. 4 1
The amendments to Section 910 also expand the requirements for
notice which a controlling shareholder must give following a "control
since January 1, 1983, and which are held by such natural person at
such time; or
(b) shares which are held at such time by any natural person or
trust, estate, foundation or other similar entity to the extent such shares
were acquired solely by gift, inheritance, bequest, devise or other testa-
mentarv distribution or series of such transactions, directly or indi-
rectly, from a natural person who had acquired such shares prior to
January 1, 1983; or
(c) shares which were acquired pursuant to a stock split, stock
dividend, reclassification or similar recapitalization with respect to
shares described under [these three subclauses] that have been held
continuously since their issuance by the corporation by the natural per-
son or entity that acquired them from the corporation, or that were
acquired, directly or indirectly, from such natural person or entity,
solely pursuant to a transaction or series of transactions described in
paragraph (b) [above], and that are held at such time by a natural per-
son or entity described in such paragraph (b).
Id.
38. Id. § 1910(E). The statute provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this subsection, fair value means a value not less
than the highest price paid per share by the controlling person or
group at any time during the ninety-day period ending on and includ-
ing the date of the control transaction plus an increment representing
any value, including without limitation any proportion of any value pay-
able for acquisition of control of the corporation, that may not be re-
flected in such price.
Id. § 1910(E)(1).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(first tier of tender offer was under-priced cash offer, followed by second tier
which was low-value junk bonds to remaining shareholders).
41. The preclusion of less than fair-priced second tiers is embodied in the
mandated statutory fair price provision. Under the amendment to § 910, an ac-
quiror is required to pay in cash at least the highest amount paid per share dur-
ing the 90-day period ending on the date of the control transaction. PA. SrAr.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(E) (Purdon Supp. 1989). This statutory fair price provision
prevents an acquiror from cashing out minority shareholders at a lower price
during the second tier. For the relevant statutory language, see supra note 38
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 34: p. 739
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transaction." 4 2 In addition, the appraisal procedures which allow a
shareholder to dissent from a control transaction and demand fair value
for his shares have been significantly changed. 4 3 Prior section 910 did
not expressly require the appraisal procedure to occur within a specific
time period following the shareholder's demand for an appraisal rem-
edy. 44 Section 910 now requires that the acquiror pay at least the statu-
tory fair value to the dissenting shareholders within a reasonable time
after a control transaction. 4 5 In addition, new section 910 provides that
the controlling shareholder must pay all costs and expenses of the court-
conducted appraisal procedure, regardless of whether the court-ap-
praised value is the same or less than the value previously offered by the
controlling shareholder. 46
Importantly, a corporation may opt out of the new amendments to
section 910 by an amendment to its articles of incorporation prior to the
date of the control transaction. 4 7 Unless the board of directors of the
corporation approves the amendment to the articles, it requires the ap-
proval of eighty percent of the shareholders entitled to vote to become
42. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(C) (Purdon Supp. 1989). In addition
to all shareholders of record, notice must now be given to the court of common
pleas in the county of Pennsylvania where the registered office of the corpora-
tion is located. Id. Importantly, the content of the notice must include the fact
that (1) all shareholders are entitled to demand the fair value of their shares;
(2) the minimum value that the shareholder can receive is the value indicated in
the statute; and (3) if the shareholder believes the fair value of the shares is
higher, he or she can pursue the appraisal remedy provided under the statute.
Id.
43. Id. § 1910(D). Prior § 910 allowed shareholders to make written de-
mand on a controlling shareholder for the fair value of their shares, "taking into
account all relevant factors," and pursue the appraisal remedy for shareholders
dissenting from particular mergers. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(E) (Purdon
Supp. 1988).
44. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Purdon Supp. 1988) (procedure for
appraisal remedy for dissenting shareholders concerning particular mergers).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(E) (Purdon Supp. 1989). The amend-
ments to § 910 require the court to appoint an appraiser within 30 days after
receipt of the share certificates of a dissenting shareholder. Id. The appraiser's
duty is to determine the fair value of the shares "as soon as reasonably practica-
ble." Id.
46. Id. Under the old appraisal proceeding provided in prior § 910, the
costs of the appraisal proceeding would normally be paid by the controlling
shareholder. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(H) (Purdon 1967). However, unlike
new § 910, the court had the power to assess costs and expenses against a dis-
senting shareholder if his refusal of the controlling shareholder's offer was "ar-
bitrary or vexatious or not in good faith." Id.
47. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(A) (Purdon Supp. 1989). In addition, the
new amendment to § 910 allows two other ways for a corporation to opt out of
its provisions. First, it could have amended its bylaws either by March 23, 1984
or within 90 days after the effective date of the amendments, i.e., March 23,
1988. Id. Secondly, § 910 does not apply if the corporation's articles originally
indicated that § 910 was inapplicable or an article amendment to that effect was
adopted prior to the date of the control transaction and prior to or subsequent
to the effective date of the new amendments, March 23, 1988. Id.
1989]
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effective. 48
The amendments to section 910 significantly affect the form of cor-
porate takeovers. The fair price and streamlined appraisal proceeding
provisions will essentially preclude one of the most abusive takeover tac-
tics, the two-tiered tender offer. 49
Counsel must alert their clients to the fact that under the amend-
ments to section 910, an acquiring corporation is required to pay a dis-
senting shareholder an amount at least equal to the highest price per share
paid by the controlling shareholder within ninety days of when the con-
trolling shareholder acquired his twenty-percent interest. 50 A control-
ling shareholder may no longer "freeze out" dissenting shareholders by
paying them less than a truly fair price for their shares following the
controlling shareholder's purchase of his or her interest. 5 1
The target corporation's shareholders must now be advised of the
streamlined appraisal remedy which requires all costs to be paid by the
controlling shareholder. 52 Thus, there is no apparent reason for share-
holders not to demand payment for their shares through the statutory
appraisal remedy. This would especially be true of shareholders that are
being advised by fearful or hostile management.
It should be noted that a target corporation's board of directors'
decision to opt out of coverage under the amendments to section 910
will likely be evaluated under the business judgment rule. Conse-
quently, absent a lack of good faith, the board of directors' decision will
be upheld. 53 In addition, like section 611, section 910 in the final analy-
sis is designed to encourage friendly takeovers.
C. Section 911: Business Combination Moratorium
Section 911, which had no counterpart in the old BCL, significantly
affects the circumstances under which a corporation may enter into
"business combinations" with "interested shareholders. ' 54 An "inter-
ested shareholder" is defined under the section as any individual who
directly or indirectly is the beneficial owner of at least twenty percent of
the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors.5 5 "Business com-
48. Id.
49. For a discussion of the fair price provisions and appraisal remedy, see
supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(E) (Purdon Supp. 1989). For the text of
this provision, see supra note 38.
51. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(second tier of merger consisted of low-value junk bonds to remaining
shareholders).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(E) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
53. For a discussion of the application of the business judgment rule in
Pennsylvania, see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
54. See PA, STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1911 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
55. Id. § 1911(A)(I1). Section 911 excludes from the 20% calculation:
(1) shares held continuously by a "natural person" since January 1, 1983 up to
748 [Vol. 34: p. 739
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [1989], Art. 16
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss3/16
19893 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 749
binations," on the other hand, are broadly defined by the new section. 5"i
the present; (2) shares held by a "natural person or trust, estate, foundation or
other similar entity to the extent such shares were acquired solely by gift, inheri-
tance, bequest, devise or other testamentary distribution" from a "natural per-
son" who had obtained the shares prior to January 1, 1983; or (3) shares
obtained through a "stock split, stock dividend, reclassification or similar recapi-
talization" held continuously since their issuance or that were obtained pursuant
to (2) described above. Id.
56. See id. § 1911(A)(5). The pertinent language of § 911 is as follows:
"Business Combination," when used in reference to any business
corporation and any interested shareholder of such business corpora-
tion, means:
(i) any merger or consolidation of such business corporation or
any subsidiary of such business corporation with (a) such interested
shareholder or (b) any other corporation (whether or not itself an inter-
ested shareholder of such business corporation) which is, or after such
merger or consolidation would be, an affiliate or associate of such inter-
ested shareholder;
(ii) any sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, transfer or other
disposition (in one transaction or a series of transactions) to or with
such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such inter-
ested shareholder of assets of such business corporation or any subsidi-
ary of such business corporation (a) having an aggregate market value
equal to ten per cent or more of the aggregate market value of all the
assets, determined on a consolidated basis, of such business corpora-
tion, (b) having an aggregate market value equal to ten per cent or
more of the aggregate market value of all the outstanding shares of
such business corporation, or (c) representing ten per cent or more of
the earning power or net income, determined on a consolidated basis,
of such business corporation;
(iii) the issuance or transfer by such business corporation or any
subsidiary of such business corporation (in one transaction or a series
of transactions) of any shares of such business corporation or any sub-
sidiary of such business corporation which has an aggregate market
value equal to five per cent or more of the aggregate market value of all
the outstanding shares of such business corporation to such interested
shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder
except pursuant to the exercise of option rights to purchase shares, or
pursuant to the conversion of securities having conversion rights, of-
fered, or a dividend or distribution paid or made, pro rata to all share-
holders of such business corporation;
(iv) the adoption of any plan or proposal for the liquidation or
dissolution of such business corporation proposed by, or pursuant to
any agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in writ-
ing) with, such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of
such interested shareholder;
(v) any reclassification of securities (including, without limitation,
any split of shares, dividend of shares, or other distribution of shares in
respect of shares, or any reverse split of shares), or recapitalization of
such business corporation, or any merger or consolidation of such busi-
ness corporation with any subsidiary of such business corporation, o"
any other transaction (whether or not with or into or otherwise involv-
ing such interested shareholder), proposed by, or pursuant to any
agreement, arrangement or understanding (whether or not in writing)
with, such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such
interested shareholder, which has the effect, directly or indirectly, of
increasing the proportionate share of the outstanding shares of' any
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Section 911 forbids interested shareholders from engaging in the
specified business combinations with the corporation for five years from
the time that the interested shareholders acquired their twenty-percent
interest.5 7 Significantly, the moratorium on business combinations is
lifted only if the transaction meets one of three exceptions. First, there
is no time limit on the business combination if it is approved by the
board of directors prior to the date the shareholder became an inter-
ested shareholder. 58 Second, the moratorium is lifted if the business
combination is approved by all of the holders of the corporation's out-
standing common shares. 59 Third, the ban is inapplicable if a majority
of the disinterested shareholders entitled to vote in an election of direc-
tors approve the transaction at a meeting called specifically for this pur-
pose, no earlier than three months after the meeting to elect directors.6t1
In addition, at the time of the meeting, the interested shareholder must
be the beneficial owner of at least eighty percent of the outstanding
stock."' To come under the third exception, the transaction must also
meet other specific price and equity acquisition conditions outlined in
section 911. 6 2 Realistically, the exceptions are likely to be extremely
class or series of voting shares or securities convertible into voting
shares of such business corporation or any subsidiary of such business
corporation which is, directly or indirectly, owned by such interested
shareholder or any affiliate or associate of such interested shareholder,
except as a result of immaterial changes due to fractional share adjust-
ments; or
(vi) any receipt by such interested shareholder or any affiliate or
associate of such interested shareholder of the benefit, directly or indi-
rectly (except proportionately as a shareholder of such business corpo-
ration), of any loans, advances, guarantees, pledges or other financial
assistance or any tax credits or other tax advantages provided by or
through such business corporation.
Id.





62. Id. One such condition for transactions involving common shares deals
with price and essentially provides as follows: the amount of cash and the fair
market values of property received by each common stock shareholder in the
business combination must be at least equal to the higher of either (i) the high-
est price paid by the interested shareholder at a time when he owned five per-
cent or more of the corporation's voting stock during the five years preceding
the announcement date of the business combination or the five years ending on
and including the date the shareholder became an "interested shareholder"
plus, in either case, interest minus dividends paid or (ii) "market value," defined
in the statute as the highest closing price for publicly traded stock or the fair
market value for stock not publicly traded during the thirty days preceding the
announcement date of the business combination or the date when the share-
holder became an "interested shareholder" plus interest, minus dividends paid.
Id. Preferred shareholders have a slightly different method for determining fair
price. Id. It is determined by the highest preferential amount per share in the
event of a voluntary liquidation, dissolution or winding up of the corporation,
750 [Vol. 34: p. 739
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difficult to meet in the environment of a hostile takeover.
After the expiration of the statutory five-year period, a corporation
may engage in business combinations approved by a majority of the dis-
interested shareholders at a meeting on the proposed combination.,"
Additionally, a corporation may engage in a business combination if that
business combination meets the specific fair price acquisition restriction
conditions outlined in section 911.64
A corporation may choose to opt out of section 911 by amending its
articles. 6"5 An amendment to opt out of section 911 requires among
other things, approval by a majority of the disinterested shareholders
entitled to vote in an election of directors. 6 6 In addition, the amend-
ment will not become effective until eighteen months after the vote, and
it will not apply to any business combination with a shareholder who
became an interested shareholder on or prior to the effective date of the
amendment.67
Moreover, section 911, by its terms, is not applicable in certain situ-
ations. First, it does not apply to corporations that do not have a class of
voting shares registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.iH
Second, section 911 is inapplicable where the corporation had no voting
shares registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 on the ef-
fective date of an amendment to the articles subjecting the corporation
to section 911, and where the interested shareholder acquired his "in-
terested share percentage" prior to the effective date of such an amend-
ment to the corporation's articles. 69 Third, section 911 is not applicable
plus the aggregate amount of any dividends declared or due. Id. An interested
shareholder also must provide all shareholders in a class or series with cash or
the same form of consideration that he previously used to acquire the largest
number of shares of that class or series. Id. Also, all disinterested shareholders
are entitled to receive the price determined under § 911. Id. In addition, an
interested shareholder is forbidden, except for limited exceptions, from making
other stock acquisitions for less than the fair price requirements of section 911.
63. Id. § 1911 (B)(3). The statutory language is as follows:
A business combination approved by the affirmative vote of the
holders of shares entitling such holders to cast a majority of the votes
that all shareholders would be entitled to cast in an election of directors
of such business corporation, not including any voting shares benefi-
cially owned by such interested shareholder or any affiliate or associate
of such interested shareholder, at a meeting called for such purpose no
earlier than five years after such interested shareholder's share acquisi-
tion date. /
Id.
64. Id. For a discussion of these specific conditions, see supra note 62.
65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1911 (C)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1989). Also, a cor-
poration may have chosen to opt out of § 911 by an amendment to the bylaws of
the corporation within 90 days of March 23, 1988, the effective date of § 911. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 1911 (C)(1). For a discussion of the corporations required to regis-
ter under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see supra note 17.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1911(C)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1989). "Interested
1989]
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where the original, articles of incorporation explicitly so provide.Vo
Fourth, section 911 does not apply if the interested shareholder both
inadvertently acquired his or her "interested share percentage" and
would not otherwise have been an interested shareholder within the
five-year period prior to the announcement date of the business combi-
nation, and the interested shareholder divests himself or herself of own-
ership to a point below the twenty-percent ownership needed to be
classified as an interested shareholder. 7 ' Fifth, section 911, on its face,
does not apply where the interested shareholder owned at least fifteen
percent of the corporation's voting stock prior to the effective date of
section 911 and maintained that percentage until the interested share-
holder's twenty-percent share ownership was reached. 7 2 Lastly, section
911 does not apply when the corporation is a subsidiary of another cor-
poration on March 23, 1988, the effective date of section 911.73
Section 911 has a major impact on a hostile acquiror's ability to
finance a takeover of a Pennsylvania corporation. Section 91 1's five-year
moratorium on certain "business combinations" limits tender offers
which are financed through high-yield securities or "junk bonds," be-
cause such financing usually requires a break-up of the target corpora-
tion to pay off the acquisition debt.7 4 The five-year moratorium makes it
difficult to arrange financing that will accommodate the five-year delay
before a target corporation may be liquidated or its revenues are avail-
able to pay off the debt. 75 In addition, the statutory fair price provisions
of section 911 prevent an acquiring entity which has been able to finance
share percentage" is the direct or indirect ownership by a shareholder of at least
20% of the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors. See id.
§ 1911(A)(11).
70. Id. § 1911 (C)(3). The statute states that § 911 does not apply if "the
articles . . . explicitly provide that this § [911] shall not be applicable to the
corporation by a provision included in the original articles." Id.
71. Id. § 1911 (C)(4). The relevant statutory language states that § 911
does not apply to a business combination with an interested shareholder if
such interested shareholder ... divests itself of a sufficient amount of
the voting shares of such business corporation so that it no longer is
the beneficial owner, directly or indirectly, of shares entitling such per-
son to cast at least twenty per cent of the votes ... entitled to [be] cast
in an election of directors of such business corporation, and . . . would
not at any time within the five-year period preceding the announcement
date with respect to such business combination have been an interested
shareholder but for such inadvertent acquisition ....
Id.
72. Id. § 1911 (C)(5). The statutory language states that § 911 does not ap-
ply "to any business combination with an interested shareholder who was the
beneficial owner . . .of shares entitling such person to cast at least fifteen per
cent of the votes," in an election of directors "on the effective date of this sec-
tion and remain so to such interested shareholder's share acquisition date." Id.
73. Id. § 1911(C)(6).
74. For a discussion of the five-year moratorium provisions, see supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text.
75. Lipton, Takeover Expert Proposes (T/iforn State Statute, 199 N.Y.L.J., Mar.
752 [Vol. 34: p. 739
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the initial stages of a takeover from cashing-out minority shareholders at
a minimum CoSt. 7 6
A possible weakness of section 911 is the ability of a hostile individ-
ual to acquire less than the twenty-percent interest required to trigger a
five-year moratorium. A hostile acquiror may acquire less than a twenty-
percent interest and then wage a takeover battle by proxy seeking ap-
proval by a majority of the disinterested shareholders. In addition, a
hostile acquiror may obtain less than the twenty-percent ownership in
the corporation and seek to obtain a new election of directors to ap-
prove the business combination. 77 The hostile individual may do so
knowing that the target corporation will react -by either restructuring,
selling the corporation at a higher price or allowing itself to be acquired
by the hostile individual. 78
Constitutional attacks on similar legislation have proved unsuccess-
ful. 7 9 Litigants have generally challenged such statutes on preemption
and dormant commerce clause grounds, only to be rejected by the
courts under the analysis of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.8 0
Consequently, an acquiring individual must either negotiate with the
target corporation or attempt to circumvent the legislation by acquiring
less than a twenty-percent interest and waging a costly proxy contest.
I1. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the new legislation enacted by Pennsylvania appears
21, 1988, at 21, col. 1 (indicating structuring of financing over five-year period is
difficult but not impossible).
76. For a discussion of these fair price provisions, see supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
77. Centaur Partners attempted this tactic in its battle to achieve control of
Pennwalt Corporation, a Pennsylvania corporation. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb.
17, 1989, at C15, col. 4. Carl Icahn attempted a similar tactic in his battle to
achieve control over Texaco, Inc., 10 Nat'l LJ., May 23, 1988, at 16, col. 2.
78. Lipton, supra note 75, at 21, col. 1 (discussing New York takeover stat-
ute where hostile individual acquires less than 15% ownership and then "puts
the target in play").
79. See, e.g., RP Acquisition Corp. v. Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp.
476 (D. Del. 1988) (rejecting plaintiff's arguments that Delaware statute with
three-year ban on certain business combinations was either preempted by Wil-
liams Act or was in violation of federal dormant commerce clause); BNS Inc. v.
Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988) (court denied preliminary injunc-
tion because it found no reasonable probability of eventual success in litigati'on
because Delaware takeover statute would likely be upheld as constitutional in
face of preemption and federal commerce clause challenges).
80. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). For a discussion of CTS Cotp., see spra notes 5-7
and accompanying text. It is possible, however, with the growing number of
stricter takeover statutes at the state level, that a reviewing court would find a
statute unconstitutional. Pennsylvania's legislation, though, appears roughly
parallel in restrictiveness to the Delaware legislation, which was recently upheld
in RP .AIcquisition Corp., 686 F. Supp. 476.
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to parallel recent similar anti-takeover statutes in other states.,, Each
section of the new legislation is aimed at particular aspects of hostile
takeovers. First, the amendments to section 611 provide a board of di-
rectors with a powerful bargaining tool with a hostile bidder.8 2 Next,
the amendments to section 910 provide a shareholder with a mechanism
to obtain a fair price in the event of a change in control of the corpora-
tion. 8 3 Finally, the adoption of section 911 helps to protect minority
shareholders from being cashed-out of the corporation while deterring
takeovers deemed harmful to the corporation.8 4 Thus, this legislation,
like that in other states, seeks to significantly alter the balance of power
in corporate law in Pennsylvania. It statutorily creates defenses to hos-
tile takeovers which are increasingly seen as having a pernicious effect
on the Commonwealth's economy. At the same time, the statute pre-
serves the corporation's ability to reap the benefits of a profitable take-
over bid.8 5 In the final analysis, a hostile acquiror is confronted with
effective legislation if it intends a takeover of a Pennsylvania corpora-
tion.
Paul D. Wfeller
81. For a list of similar enactments, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
82. For a discussion of the amendments to § 611, see supra notes 13-30 and
accompanying text.
83. For a discussion of the amendments to § 910, see supra notes 31-53 and
accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of new § 911, see supra notes 54-78 and accompanying
text.
85. Governor Casey indicated that the new legislation "is designed so that
it does not prevent takeovers that breathe new life into moribund businesses,
dislodge poor management, or otherwise result in economic benefits in the
opinion of impartial shareholders." Casey Signs Shareholder Protection Legislation,
supra note 1, at 2.
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